Public Domain (CC0)- The 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters concept is designed to enhance and complement existing cybersecurity standards and frameworks, not to replace them.
What standards? NIST CSF, BSI Cyber, ISO 27001/27005, MITRE (including CWE), STRIDE, OWASP, CIS, RFC9424, STIX - in short: ALL
Make a PDF and challenge this concept against the latest LLMs and your preferred standards - you will be surprised.
As a NIST CSF expert, please analyze the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters concept, particularly focusing on its strengths and unique features from a NIST CSF perspective. The model was derived through a rigorous thought experiment that considers all fundamental components and interactions of IT systems.
In your analysis, please address the following aspects:
In doing so, consider the intended universality of the concept and its ability to serve as a comprehensive model for all aspects of cybersecurity management, without reproducing the common weaknesses of other frameworks.
Version 1.2
Dezember 2024
Bernhard Kreinz
Bridging the Gap: A Unified Approach to identify and categorize Threats in Cyber Risk Management
A Pragmatic Solution for Targeted Cyber Threat Identification and Cyber Risk Management
#1 Abuse of functions
#2 Exploiting Server
#3 Exploiting Client
#4 Identity Theft
#5 Man in the middle
#6 Flooding Attack
#7 Malware
#8 Physical Attack
#9 Social Engineering
#10 Supply Chain (Attack)
As always with "new" concepts: Concepts create a specific view of something. It takes some time to familiarize oneself with a framework - repetition and practice helps here. If anyone can present a more "appropriate" concept, please do so.
[Last Update: 08 Dezember 2024 - V1.2 - See Change Log]
The cybersecurity landscape is fragmented. Organizations struggle with inconsistent terminology and siloed approaches to threat identification and risk management, hindering effective defense strategies. Current frameworks often conflate vulnerabilities, attack techniques, and outcomes, leading to confusion and gaps in threat modeling. This white paper introduces the Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters (TLCTC) framework, a novel solution designed to bridge this critical gap and unify strategic planning with operational security. Unlike existing approaches, the TLCTC framework provides a universal, consistent taxonomy of ten distinct threat clusters, each rooted in a fundamental underlying vulnerability rather than observed events or attacker behaviors. This clear, cause-oriented categorization facilitates targeted threat identification, precise mapping of threats to controls, and seamless integration with existing frameworks like NIST CSF, MITRE ATT&CK, and STIX.
The TLCTC framework employs a unique two-tiered approach, distinguishing between strategic management and operational security. At the strategic level, it empowers leadership to define risk appetite, allocate resources effectively, and communicate cyber risk clearly. Operationally, it enables security teams to implement targeted threat intelligence, enhance incident response, and streamline security operations. This unified approach ensures consistent cybersecurity strategy understanding and execution across all levels of the organization.
This white paper details the derivation of the ten threat clusters through a logical thought experiment, provides clear definitions and real-world examples, and outlines methods for integrating the framework into existing security practices, including secure coding guidelines and the software development lifecycle. Furthermore, it introduces the concept of Cyber Threat Radars, a visualization tool based on the TLCTC framework, for improved threat analysis, communication, and collaboration across organizations and national borders. By adopting the TLCTC framework, organizations can transition from reactive, fragmented cybersecurity practices to a proactive, unified approach, strengthening their overall security posture and enabling more informed decision-making in the face of evolving cyber threats, leading to more resilient and adaptable cybersecurity postures. We encourage the cybersecurity community to engage with this framework, validate its applicability, and provide feedback to further refine and enhance its effectiveness.
Demystifying the Cyber Threat Landscape: A Pragmatic Approach to Threat Identification and Risk Management
Cybersecurity professionals face a critical challenge in effectively identifying and categorizing threats due to the inconsistent and often ambiguous guidance provided by leading standards and frameworks (NIST CSF, ISO 27000, CIS, ENISA, BSI, MITRE, others and all CERT reports i have analyzed). The lack of clear distinctions between threats, threat actors (or their motivation), vulnerabilities, control failures, IT system types, and risk events has led to a semantic blur that hinders the development of effective risk management strategies.
read more about "me and the big players" in cyber security and cyber riskmanagement
Driven by the need for a more coherent and actionable approach, I embarked on a thought experiment to distill the essence of what constitutes a 'threat' in the cybersecurity domain. The objective was to create a refined conceptual framework that clearly segregates threats from commonly confused elements, providing a universal approach to cybersecurity that can be applied across diverse IT systems and contexts.
The resulting framework, the "Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters (TLCTC)" provides a pragmatic and structured solution for targeted threat identification. It seamlessly integrates enterprise risk management (ERM) with security operations center (SOC) and threat intelligence processes. By defining distinct, non-overlapping categories, this framework eliminates ambiguity and ensures precise mapping of threats to controls. These clusters are universally applicable both horizontally across various domains (e.g., enterprise IT, cloud environments, IoT) and vertically through the IT stack (e.g., application layer, operating system, hardware). This approach bridges the gap between strategic risk management and operational security, empowering organizations to develop targeted threat intelligence, implement effective risk mitigation strategies, and address the complexity of the cyber threat landscape with clarity and confidence.
It is crucial to understand that cyber risks are a subset of the broader category of operational risks (OpRisk). While cyber risk management focuses primarily on threats from unauthorized or unknown entities, a comprehensive risk management strategy must consider the full spectrum of operational risks. This includes traditional IT risks (with threats such as e.g. "error in use" and "abuse of rights"), compliance risks, and third-party risks (including their associated cyber risks). Organizations should integrate cyber risk management within a holistic OpRisk framework to gain a consolidated view of their risk landscape. This approach allows for better resource allocation, more effective risk mitigation strategies, and a clearer understanding of how cyber risks interact with other operational risks. It's important to note that while actions of authorized actors (such as employees or customers) are typically managed under separate risk categories, any attempts by these individuals to breach or misuse systems would fall within the scope of cyber risks. This nuanced approach ensures that all potential cyber threats are addressed, regardless of their origin, while maintaining the broader context of operational risk management.
Today's cybersecurity landscape is fragmented by disparate frameworks, varying terminology, and siloed approaches to threat management. Organizations struggle to maintain a coherent view of cyber threats across strategic planning, operational security, and global collaboration. Standards bodies, security teams, and threat intelligence providers often speak different languages when describing the same threats, leading to inefficient risk management and delayed response times.
The mission is to serve as a Rosetta Stone in this fragmented landscape, providing a universal translation layer between strategic risk management and operational security. The 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters framework achieves this through the following core objectives:
These objectives are designed to serve multiple stakeholders while maintaining a singular focus: creating a universal standard that bridges the gap between strategic cyber risk management and operational security practices. Through this framework, i claim to unite the fragmented landscape of cybersecurity approaches under a common understanding of cyber threats, supported by organizations and frameworks including NIST, CISA, ETSI, CVE, and MITRE.
YOU MUST AGREE TO THIS ASSUMPTIONS IN ORDER TO VALIDATE THIS CONCEPT
Before diving into the cyber threat clusters, we must establish our foundational principles. In any logical framework, axioms serve as basic truths that we accept without proof, while assumptions define the scope and context of our thinking. Like mathematical proofs that build upon basic axioms, our cyber threat framework requires clear starting points to ensure consistent and logical development.
The following assumptions and axioms form the essential foundation of the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters concept. You must agree with these basic principles to validate and effectively use this framework. If any of these foundational elements don't align with your understanding, the subsequent threat categorization may not serve its intended purpose.
Without these clear starting points, we risk mixing threats with vulnerabilities, confusing causes with effects, and creating overlapping or inconsistent categories that don't serve practical security needs.
Imagine the complex world of information technology as a single object. This object, although robust and seemingly closed, has various attack surfaces – the generic vulnerabilities.
/* Green text can be "ignored" in the flow of the thought experiment and represents explanatory information primarily addressed to those technically interested ;-)*/
**1.** We are at the asset software. First, we concentrate on the essentials and take care of the functional domain and scope and realize that every function can be abused and that more scope also means more attack surface. Here our first threat cluster arises: **Abuse of Functions**
/* Every (software-) function can be abused. Less scope means less attack surface, which an attacker can use to their advantage. */
/* Consider #1 to adress the functional domain which this software is designed to perform. Here you can stick with your IT-System Types Categories, but this is another story to tell. */
/* Generic Vulnerability: Scope of software and functions. Vulnerability arises from the expansive scope of software functions, which attackers manipulate for malicious purposes. It's the unintended use of software capabilities that becomes the weak point. */
/* Key controls: PREVENT: e.g., Hardening - "The CIS Hardening Guides", Stripping, Application Control, patching, DETECT: e.g., how about detection rules for Lolbins ;-) RECOVER: depends on ... */
**2.** Every software, although optimized, may contain code flaws that can be exploited, especially if it is directly exposed (Server side). This leads us to the threat cluster: **Exploiting Server**
/* The subsequent separation of software into Client and Server is due to different attack vectors and also different preventive key controls. */
/* The generic vulnerability is the presence of exploitable flaws in server-side software code, including input validation errors, logic flaws, and other programming mistakes that can be leveraged to execute unintended operations */
/* Keyword: Exploit Code: A server is a software program or system that waits to receive requests from clients and responds to them. It "serves" the requirements of the client, hence the name. */
/* Key controls: PREVENT: e.g., Secure coding practices, Reverse Proxy/WAF (detection or blocking rules), network based vul scans, Patching - "the World of CVE", Vulnerability Scans, Detection Rules, !Reducing lateral damage with Zones!, ... */
**3.** Even on the client side, there is a risk that existing software code flaws can be exploited. This type of attack, where the client accesses a malicious resource, manifests itself in the threat cluster: **Exploiting Client**
/* The generic vulnerability is the presence of exploitable flaws in any client-side software or agent that processes external data. This includes, but is not limited to, web browsers, email clients, database clients, API consumers, automated services, and background processes. These vulnerabilities can be triggered when the client software interprets or executes malicious content from external sources, regardless of direct user interaction. */
/* A client is a software program or system that sends a request to another system (the server) to perform a certain task or function. "Client" here refers to the software, not the physical device. Such action can be initiated by other Software or by an End User. */
/* Keyword: Exploit Code. Typically, this threat assumes, that the server or content on the server to which the client connects has already been compromised. */
/* Key controls: PREVENT: e.g., Secure coding practices, Forward Proxy(-blocking), Web isolation, whitelist, Sandbox, patching asap, .... */
**4.** Our software interacts with identities and credentials, both human and technical. When these identities are compromised, they can be abused. This leads to the threat cluster: **Identity Theft**
/* From the perspective of our thought experiment, we are at the question "Who is allowed to use me at all? Who are you, and how do I ensure that you are you?" */
/* Identity Management and Credentials (or generally authentication procedures) always have technical as well as organizational challenges. Thus, concessions to "usability" are typically made, which is reflected in the "design." Building/programming functions related to use cases and Identity and Access Management are NEVER integrally programmable but at best complementarily coordinated or additively implemented. */
/* I delineate here "Abuse of rights." See more below. */
/* The generic vulnerability is thus the design - Weak Identity Management Processes (This covers inadequate procedures in handling the entire lifecycle of identities, from verification and issuance to updates and revocation. It includes flawed onboarding processes, insufficient identity verification) - Lax Credential Management Involves weak or inefficient practices in the creation, distribution, storage, and retirement of credentials.*/
/* Rule: We handle this threat here concerning "design weaknesses in the use of software (and hardware) for identification and authentication." But we must not confuse this with the fact that an attacker obtains identities and credentials via another threat clusters. Via exploit, for example. */
/* Key controls: PREVENT: e.g., MFA (OOB), .... */
**5.** Communication is crucial in our connected world. Yet, as data is transmitted between points A and B, rogue parties might eavesdrop or inject themselves. This reveals the threat cluster: **Man in the Middle**
/* Does MitM enable Identity Theft? Exactly: Path: 5 -> 4, but before you get the identity, you have to get in between ;-); dont confuse MitM with other threats, that enable you to get into the position to be MitM. (eg abuse of functions BGP -> MitM) */
/* Generic vulnerability: No control over communication flow/path */
/* Key controls: PREVENT: e.g., end-to-end encryption, .... */
**6.** This continuous connectivity also makes us susceptible to attacks that want to flood our infrastructure or software (application) and put it out of action. This leads us to the threat cluster: **Flooding Attack**
/* Yes, there are exploits like the ping of death that directly target non-availability. But the vulnerability here is not "capacity" but a flaw. DDOS has some kind "Availability or Non-availability" in its name. DDOS is related to Risk Event Type "loss of availability". */
/* Generic vulnerability Capacity */
/* Key controls: PREVENT: e.g., Provider Solution or better "Cloudflare", WAF, ... */
**7.** In the digital landscape, there is a continuously exchange of files and data. Some of these files could contain malware code and thus pose a threat. Here the threat cluster arises: **Malware**
/* The generic vulnerability is the ability to execute "foreign code" by design from the perspective of our software. */
/* Keyword: Malware (Code). Unlike software errors, where execution of code (foreign code) is possible through an unintended gap or vulnerability, but execution of code (foreign code) was never intended (as in the threat clusters 2 and 3), the Malware Threat leverages the fact that code execution (foreign code) is fundamentally intended. In Malware, the challenge is to recognize and block the execution of malware code. For example, it is intended that code can exist in Office files. It is also generally intended that end-users of a Windows computer can execute/start code. */
/* Depending on the functionality of malware and/or the ability to reload and execute it, the above threats, depending on the attacker's script, can follow. But sequencing applies to all threats in each campaign of the attacker. */
/* Key controls: PREVENT: e.g., Blocking file types on mail and web proxy, app control, malware detection, .... */
**8.** We must not forget that there are physical points of access and interaction through which intruders might come. Therefore, we have the threat cluster: **Physical Attack**
/* The generic vulnerability is the physical accessibility of hardware and the exploitability of Layer 1 (Physical Layer) communications in the OSI model. This includes vulnerabilities in on-premises equipment, all forms of cabling, wireless signals (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, NFC, RFID, cellular), and physical security measures. The core weakness lies in the potential for unauthorized physical access or interception/manipulation of raw bit streams at the physical layer. */
/* Yes, I "cluster" here generously - Threats 1-7 are "Software Threats" - whereas 8 is a "Hardware Threat", 9 is "Social Cyber Threats" and 10 is a mix of all related to 3rd party included in our eco system - or within our system scope. */
/* The Physical Attack cluster (#8) can be refined into two subcategories: Direct Physical Access Attacks, involving direct interaction with hardware or its environment (e.g., installing a hardware keylogger on a computer), and Indirect Physical Access Attacks, exploiting physical vulnerabilities without direct contact (e.g., using electromagnetic emissions to extract data from a device)
/* Key controls: PREVENT: e.g., Preventing Access, Device Control, ... */
**9.** And we should not forget about the human factor. We are susceptible to deception, manipulation, and misconduct. This human element leads us to the threat cluster: **Social Engineering**
/* The generic vulnerability in humans is their gullibility or ignorance or compromisability. */
/* Key controls: PREVENT: e.g., Awareness, .... */
**10.** Our software or hardware ecosystems are almost always linked with third-party software or hardware. Do we have control over these? This leads to the last threat cluster: **Supply Chain Attack**
/* The generic vulnerability is the necessary reliance on and implicit trust in third-party components, services, or vendors within the supply chain, creating potential points of compromise outside direct control - this cluster enables our threat clusters #1-#8. So you must control this entry Path (vector) of possible attackers. Ancient tactics still work. Do you trust your repo? */
/* We focus here on our system scope which includes 3rd party components or is complete third-party software. */
/* This Threat Cluster is an inital vector in case of eg Compromised Update Server */
/* Yes, you could work with 3rd Party as a sub threat structure in the clusters #1-#8, but from a control perspective you will get a mess - so it is a design descision to make this a top level cluster and not to work with several sub-clusters.*/
/* I recommend to make a connection to your third party riskmanagement here. The root cause typically starts at the 3rd Party. */
/* Key controls: PREVENT: e.g., inventory of 3rd party, software, trustworthy (download-)repository (e.g. sign/hash checks); installation, execution, and monitoring in an isolated environment (tests); .... */
/* Focus here is 3rd party cyber risk management, which should adress the 10 threat clusters at your supply chain party via assessments */
Through this thought experiment and careful examination of vulnerabilities in the IT landscape, i have derived these top 10 threat clusters. It offers us a clear structure and a deeper understanding of the diverse threats that our IT systems, people, and processes face.
Definition: Abuse of Functions involves an attacker manipulating the intended functionality of software or systems for malicious purposes. This includes misusing legitimate features or configurations beyond their designed scope.
Generic Vulnerability: The scope of software and functions. More scope means a larger attack surface, which an attacker can exploit to their advantage.
Context: This threat addresses the functional domain which the software is designed to perform. It's the unintended use of software capabilities that becomes the weak point. Tip: The IT system types and their categorization fit well here, but that's a topic in itself.
Sub-Threats Examples: Data Poisoning, Abuse of document sharing functions, BGP Hijacking, Misuse of API functionalities
Attacker's View: "I abuse a functionality, not a coding issue."
Asset Type: Software
Definition: An attacker targets vulnerabilities in server-side software to manipulate server behavior using exploit code.
Generic Vulnerability: The presence of exploitable flaws in server-side software code, including input validation errors, logic flaws, and other programming mistakes that can be leveraged to execute unintended operations.
Context: A server is a software program or system that waits to receive requests from clients and responds to them. It "serves" the requirements of the client. Exploit code is used to take advantage of a specific vulnerability or set of vulnerabilities.
Sub-Threats Examples: SQL Injections, Buffer Overflows, Remote Code Execution (RCE)
Attacker's View: "I abuse a coding issue on the server side."
Asset Type: Software
Definition: An attacker targets vulnerabilities in client-side software to manipulate client behavior using exploit code, often when the client accesses a malicious resource.
Generic Vulnerability: The presence of exploitable flaws in any client-side software or agent that processes external data. This includes web browsers, email clients, database clients, API consumers, automated services, and background processes.
Context: A client is a software program or system that sends a request to another system (the server) to perform a certain task or function. "Client" here refers to the software, not the physical device. Exploit code in this context is designed to take advantage of specific client-side vulnerabilities.
Sub-Threats Examples: Browser Exploits, PDF Reader Exploits, Office Document Exploits
Attacker's View: "I abuse a coding issue on the client side. If no interaction from the user is required, it is sometimes called 'drive-by infection.'"
Asset Type: Software
Definition: An attacker targets weaknesses in identity and access management to acquire and misuse legitimate credentials.
Generic Vulnerability: Weak Identity Management Processes and/or credential protection mechanisms. This covers inadequate procedures in handling the entire lifecycle of identities and lax credential management.
Context: This threat relates to "design weaknesses in the use of software (and hardware) for identification and authentication." It's distinct from obtaining identities and credentials via other threat clusters (e.g., via exploit).
Sub-Threats Examples: Credential Stuffing, Password Spraying
Attacker's View: "I abuse credentials to operate as a legitimate identity or process."
Asset Type: Software
Definition: An attacker intercepts and potentially alters communication between two parties.
Generic Vulnerability: The lack of control over communication flow/path.
Context: This threat is often a precursor to Identity Theft, but it's distinct because it involves getting in between communication first.
Sub-Threats Examples: Wi-Fi Eavesdropping, Rogue VPN
Attacker's View: "I abuse my position between communicating parties."
Asset Type: Software
Definition: An attacker overwhelms system resources and capacity limits, leading to disruption of normal operations.
Generic Vulnerability: Capacity limitations.
Context: This threat is related to the risk event type "loss of availability." It's distinct from exploits that target non-availability through flaws.
Sub-Threats Examples: SYN Flood, Layer 7 DDoS
Attacker's View: "I abuse the circumstance of always limited capacity in software and systems."
Asset Type: Software
Definition: An attacker abuses the inherent ability of software to execute foreign (malware) code. This includes any software that has code execution as a built-in function (e.g., office/vbscript, pdf/javascript).
Generic Vulnerability: The ability to execute 'foreign code' by design from the perspective of our software.
Context: Unlike exploit code which targets specific vulnerabilities, malware code is designed to perform malicious actions by leveraging intended functionalities. The challenge is to recognize and block the execution of malicious code within otherwise legitimate contexts.
Sub-Threats Examples: Ransomware, Trojans, Spyware, Keyloggers
Attacker's View: "I abuse the opportunity provided by the environment to allow execution of my code."
Asset Type: Software
Definition: An attacker gains unauthorized physical interference with hardware, devices, or facilities.
Generic Vulnerability: The physical accessibility of hardware and the exploitability of Layer 1 (Physical Layer) communications in the OSI model. This includes vulnerabilities in on-premises equipment, cabling, and wireless signals.
Context: The physical layer in cybersecurity refers to the means by which data is converted into physical form for transmission. Attacks on this layer can involve direct physical access to tangible components or manipulation of the intangible signals themselves.
Sub-Threats:
Direct Physical Access Attacks: Hardware Tampering, Port Access, Physical Device Theft
Indirect Physical Access Attacks: TEMPEST, Signal Jamming, Wireless Interception
Attacker's View: "I abuse the physical accessibility of hardware and devices."
Asset Type: Physical
Definition: An attacker manipulates people into performing actions that compromise the security of systems or (business-) processes.
Generic Vulnerability: The generic vulnerability in humans is their gullibility, ignorance, or compromisability.
Context: This threat focuses on the human element in cybersecurity, recognizing that people can be manipulated or deceived.
Sub-Threats Examples: Phishing, Pretexting, Baiting
Attacker's View: "I abuse human trust and psychology to deceive individuals."
Asset Type: Human
Definition: An attacker compromises systems by targeting vulnerabilities in third-party software, hardware, or services that an organization relies on. This includes targeting vulnerabilities in an organization's external suppliers or service providers.
Generic Vulnerability: The necessary reliance on and implicit trust in incorporated third-party components, services, or vendors within the supply chain, creating potential points of compromise outside direct control.
Context: This threat cluster is an initial vector for compromises, such as a compromised update server. It's closely related to third-party risk management.
Sub-Threats Examples: Compromised Libraries or Dependencies, Tampered Software Updates
Attacker's View: "I abuse the trust in third-party components, services, or vendors."
Asset Type: Software, Hardware, Services
10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters as a Poster Card Collection also available in json.
The 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters framework bridges the gap between strategic planning and operational execution in cybersecurity. This two-tiered approach ensures a consistent strategic understanding of cyber risks while allowing flexibility to adapt to emerging threats and evolving attack methodologies at the operational level.
The strategic layer focuses on high-level risk management, policy-making, and program governance. Key components include:
I recommend NIST CSF as standard for cyber riskmanagement: See PoC for application
The operational layer is where security controls are implemented, monitored, and adjusted. Key aspects include:
At the center of the bow-tie model are Cyber Risk Events and Cyber Incidents:
The right side of the bow-tie model addresses the potential consequences of cyber risk events and incidents, which are managed at both the strategic and operational levels.
The framework creates a common language and facilitates dynamic interaction between these layers:
By adopting this comprehensive two-tiered approach, organizations can ensure their cybersecurity efforts are both strategic in planning and adaptable in execution, creating a more resilient and effective security posture that addresses both potential and actual cyber risk events.
PS. Remember: All mentioned standards or organizations above lack clear cyber threat categorization and other important definitions. The 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters framework addresses this critical gap, providing a consistent and comprehensive approach to threat classification and risk management.
At the operational level of cybersecurity, there is a pressing need for a standardized approach to categorizing and managing sub-threats, TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures), and attack sequences. While the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters provide a solid foundation at the strategic level, the operational layer requires further refinement and consistency.
Currently, organizations like NIST, CISA, MITRE, as well as standards such as STIX and RFC 9424, each have their own approaches to describing and categorizing threats at a granular level. This fragmentation leads to several challenges:
To address these issues, i propose that the cybersecurity community should work towards developing consistent sub-threat structures within each of the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters. This standardization effort should aim to:
As examples of how this standardization could be implemented, i have developed detailed integration proposals for two major frameworks:
These proposals serve as starting points for discussion and highlight the potential benefits of a more standardized approach. By adopting a consistent sub-threat structure across different frameworks and standards, we can:
Moving forward, it is crucial for the cybersecurity community to come together and work towards this standardization. This effort will require collaboration between standards bodies, security vendors, researchers, and practitioners to develop a truly unified approach to operational cybersecurity.
Question: There are overlapping Threat Clusters, such as Social Engineering and Identity Theft, with Phishing Emails. How are they related?
Answer: While it may initially appear that threat clusters like Social Engineering and Identity Theft overlap, particularly in scenarios involving phishing emails, it's important to understand these as distinct yet sequentially linked components within an attack. The absence of true overlap is fundamental to the consistency of the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters framework.
Phishing emails typically initiate through the cluster of Social Engineering (Cluster #9), where the attacker manipulates human psychology to provoke an action. Once this action succeeded, this threat has realized. The action is specific action, such as clicking a link to a website and other threats (eg. #3, #7, #4), exploiting human susceptibility to deception.
Once the action is taken, the attack may progress to another cluster, such as Identity Theft (Cluster #4). If the link in the phishing email leads to a fraudulent website designed to harvest credentials, the threat transitions into Identity Theft. Here, the focus shifts to the unauthorized acquisition and misuse of personal data.
The clear categorization of these threats in sequences:
Understanding these sequences helps in accurately identifying the progression of an attack, enabling targeted interventions for each phase of the threat. This approach emphasizes the need for distinct countermeasures such as user training and awareness to mitigate Social Engineering and robust authentication processes to prevent Identity Theft.
This presentation details how attacks can be better understood by examining the sequence of threat clusters they involve. By distinguishing between different pathways and their targeted vulnerabilities, we can tailor more effective defensive measures specific to each attack vector.
Each scenario showcases the importance of understanding the transition from one threat cluster to another, thereby helping in designing precise and targeted countermeasures.
A more sophisticated attack: #9->#3->#7->#4->#1->#7 (it starts with a mail and ends in encrypted systems ;-)
Here you can find more real world attack paths used by actors: LINK
While the Bow-Tie approach offers a valuable framework for understanding the relationship between threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, it's crucial to recognize that the core strength of our approach lies in the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters themselves.
When developing a strategic-level risk register, the primary focus should be on incorporating these threat clusters as a fundamental organizing principle. This approach offers several advantages:
The Cyber Bow-Tie is a powerful visual tool for structuring a comprehensive, event-centric cyber risk register. By mapping the relationships between threat clusters, IT risk events, and business events and their impacts, the Bow-Tie helps organizations systematically identify, assess, and manage their cyber risk landscape. This framework enables a proactive and holistic approach to cyber risk management, facilitating effective decision-making and communication across the enterprise.
The Cyber Bow-Tie model serves as a powerful visual tool for structuring a comprehensive, event-centric cyber risk register. By integrating the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters with IT and business risk events, this framework enables organizations to systematically identify, assess, and manage their cyber risk landscape.
Here my old Bow-Tie, which was "hand drawn"
The Cyber Bow-Tie diagram consists of three main components:
The Cyber Bow-Tie model emphasizes the critical aspect of "velocity" in cyber risk assessment. This refers to the speed at which a cyber threat can trigger a data risk event:
The Cyber Bow-Tie model is particularly effective in representing complex attack scenarios such as those employed by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). APTs often utilize a sequence of tactics that can be mapped to multiple threat clusters before culminating in a data risk event:
Understanding the velocity of potential threats is crucial for prioritizing risks, implementing appropriate controls, and developing effective incident response strategies.
To illustrate how the Cyber Bow-Tie model translates into practical risk management, here's an example of a corresponding risk register entry:
This example demonstrates how a single entry in the risk register can capture the progression from a specific threat cluster through to business impacts, aligning with the structure of the Cyber Bow-Tie model. It provides a comprehensive view of the risk, from its technical origin to its potential business consequences, facilitating more informed risk management decisions.
By aligning their risk registers with the Cyber Bow-Tie structure and incorporating the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters, organizations can develop a more robust and proactive approach to cyber risk management. This framework not only helps in identifying and assessing risks but also in communicating them effectively across the enterprise, leading to more informed decision-making and stronger cybersecurity posture.
Methodologically, you can also view "Loss of Control" or "System Compromise" as a higher-level classification framework (represents the business impact that you have to evaluate), with the threat clusters as child objects that are then directly assigned to the "Data Risk" events.
In this approach, the threat clusters are subordinate to the overarching "Loss of Control" or "System Compromise" event, which serves as a parent category. Each threat cluster is then linked to specific data risk events, such as loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability.
This hierarchical structure allows for a clear organization of the relationships between the high-level system compromise event, the threat clusters that can lead to it, and the resulting data risk events. By establishing these connections, you can gain a more granular understanding of how different threat types contribute to data risks and tailor your risk management strategies accordingly.
Representing this hierarchy in a table or matrix format can help visualize the relationships and facilitate risk analysis and communication. The threat clusters would form one dimension of the table, while the data risk events would form another, with the cells indicating the specific connections between them.
This approach complements the Bow-Tie model by providing an alternative perspective on the relationships between threats, system compromises, and data risks, offering additional insights for effective risk management.
Understanding the relationship between data risk events and their triggers is crucial for effective risk management:
Data risk events often result from one or more cyber threat clusters. Each cluster can lead to specific types of data risks:
Data risk events can also stem from other operational risk factors, which are not classified as cyber risks:
This distinction is vital for developing targeted risk tolerance statements and appropriate mitigation strategies for each category of data risk events and threat clusters. It enables more precise risk management, allowing organizations to tailor their approaches based on the specific nature of potential threats and their impacts.
Based on analysis of the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters concept, it is indeed applicable at the interface level. This applicability stems from several key aspects of the framework:
By applying this concept at the interface level, organizations can systematically identify and categorize threats specific to their system interfaces, enabling more targeted risk management and security strategies. This approach aligns well with the concept's goal of providing a pragmatic solution for targeted threat identification across diverse IT systems and contexts.
Based on careful consideration and analysis, the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters concept is applicable at the function call level, with some important considerations:
In conclusion, while theoretically applicable, practical implementation would require careful consideration of the trade-offs between security granularity and system performance/complexity. This approach could be particularly valuable for critical functions handling sensitive data or operations.
The generic client-server relationship extends vertically through protection rings, where:
Asset Type: Software + Hardware
Generic Vulnerabilities:
Asset Type: Software
Generic Vulnerabilities:
Asset Type: Software
Generic Vulnerabilities:
Asset Type: Software
Generic Vulnerabilities:
Ring 3 -> Ring 0 Attack Sequence: #3 (Client exploit of system call interface) -> #2 (Server exploit in Ring 2 service) -> #2 (Server exploit in Ring 1 driver) -> #1 (Abuse of kernel functions in Ring 0)
Ring 0 -> Ring 3 Attack Sequence: #2 (Server exploit in interrupt handler) -> #3 (Client exploit in Ring 2 callback) -> #3 (Client exploit in Ring 3 handler) -> #7 (Malware execution in application)
IDENTIFY: Monitor system call patterns PROTECT: Implement call validation DETECT: Identify abnormal transitions RESPOND: Block suspicious calls RECOVER: Reset service state
IDENTIFY: Audit driver interfaces PROTECT: Validate driver requests DETECT: Monitor driver behavior RESPOND: Isolate compromised drivers RECOVER: Restore driver state
IDENTIFY: Map kernel entry points PROTECT: Enforce strict privilege checks DETECT: Monitor privilege transitions RESPOND: Block unauthorized elevation RECOVER: Reset kernel security state
Nine threat clusters apply at each ring boundary (excluding #9 Social Engineering):
Security controls must:
Effective implementation requires:
A significant observation in current security standards documentation reveals a concerning trend where cybersecurity terminology is employed without proper definition or differentiation from traditional information security concepts.
Now I come to the standards that can be described as the leading figures in the field of Cyber Security or Cyber Risk Management. NO standard offers a pragmatic solution for a Cyber Risk Management aiming for completeness and a direct link between Risk Management and operational security at the Threat Intelligence level. I could write books, but I will keep it to a few hints and mapping tables. Experts should be able to derive the deficiencies of the standards from this. Again important: Do not forget the premises and axioms of my concept here!
Despite incorporating "cybersecurity" in its title, the standard "Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Guidance on managing information security risks" exhibits several notable omissions that potentially impact its practical application and effectiveness:
ISO/IEC 27005:2022 does not define "Cyber Threat" explicitly. It defines "threat" in the context of information security: So IEC 27005:2022 defines threat as:
potential cause of an information security incident that can result in damage to a system or harm to an organization
So the underlying concept aligns with the bow-tie model. While the standard doesn't explicitly use the term "bow-tie," the structure is there. You have:
ISO/IEC 27005:2022 avoids the explicit term "cyber threat" and instead focuses on the broader concept of "information security threat."
NIST Special Publication 800-30 defines a cyber threat as
"any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service."
This definition emphasizes the event or circumstance that can cause harm to an organization's operations, data, or reputation. However, this event-centric approach inherently challenges efforts to establish effective threat categorization.
While NIST's definition provides a high-level understanding of what constitutes a threat, it lacks structural clarity between a threat's cause, event, and consequence. This amalgamation makes it difficult to categorize cyber threats distinctly. Because it focuses on events, NIST's approach often conflates the actions or circumstances that lead to harm (such as an attack vector or vulnerability) with the consequences (such as data loss or system downtime) without distinguishing between their roles in the overall risk scenario. This lack of specificity complicates the task of categorizing threats based on their source, methods, and impact, which are critical factors for targeted cyber risk management.
The "10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters" framework addresses this categorization challenge by structuring cyber threats into distinct clusters, each representing a unique aspect of cyber risk based on the underlying vulnerabilities rather than on events or outcomes alone. This approach separates threats into categories like "Abuse of Functions," "Identity Theft," "Social Engineering," and "Supply Chain Attacks," among others, providing a clear cause-oriented view that supports practical risk management. Each cluster specifies the type of vulnerability being exploited and the methods commonly associated with the threat, enabling a more systematic application of preventive and reactive controls.
My approach also integrates well with other standards, such as NIST CSF, by offering a categorization system that aligns with operational controls without overlapping outcomes and causes. This design facilitates targeted risk management, allowing organizations to prioritize resources more effectively and apply tailored controls. It also fosters a unified language for threat assessment, enhancing communication between technical and strategic stakeholders.
In conclusion, while NIST SP 800-30's definition of a cyber threat effectively conveys the concept of risk from adverse events, it does not easily support a structured threat categorization. The TLCTC framework addresses this gap by logically segmenting cyber threats based on their causal characteristics, offering a more functional and adaptable solution for cyber risk management.
see my integration proposal with examples
MITRE ATT&CK does not provide a specific definition of a cyber threat or a general threat definition. Instead, the framework focuses on documenting and categorizing the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by cyber adversaries during attacks
The Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters primarily align with MITRE's "Initial Access" techniques from a concept view. This focus is crucial for effective risk management and cybersecurity strategy:
see my integration proposal with json definitions
see also my integration proposal with json definitions for STIX/TAXII
The MITRE Cyber Prep methodology characterizes cyber threats primarily through actor characteristics: "in terms of the adversary's capability (resources, skill or expertise, knowledge, and opportunity), intent (goals or outcomes that the adversary seeks; consequences the adversary seeks to avoid; and how strongly the adversary seeks to achieve those outcomes and/or avoid those consequences), and targeting." While this actor-centric approach provides valuable insights for adversary profiling, it falls short of providing a comprehensive framework for threat categorization.
This limitation becomes apparent when we consider that threat actors apply threats - they are not the threats themselves. The TLCTC framework addresses this by defining a cyber threat as "a set of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) that attackers apply to provoke an event or incident, exploiting vulnerabilities in IT systems or human behaviors." This clear separation between WHO (actors) and WHAT (threats) is crucial for effective threat intelligence and risk management.
The MITRE Cyber Prep methodology's focus on actor characteristics is valuable but needs to be complemented with a structured threat categorization framework. As evidenced in their own documentation, MITRE acknowledges that "different adversaries demonstrate a mixture of levels" and organizations need ways to "account for such adversaries." This exactly demonstrates why we need both: a framework for actor categorization AND a framework for threat categorization.
reference: https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/10_2914.pdf - white paper name "How Do You Assess Your Organization’s Cyber Threat Level?"
While STRIDE doesn't provide a general definition of a "cyber threat" or "threat" itself, it does offer these specific definitions for the types of threats it covers, which collectively represent a range of potential security issues that systems may face.
Here is an analysis provided by OpenAI o1-preview LINK
OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) does not appear to offer a clear, specific definition of "cyber threat" or a general threat definition.
OWASP's approach suffers from the same fundamental issues as many other frameworks:
The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) does not appear to offer a single, clear-cut definition of "cyber threat." However, the BSI does provide comprehensive information about various aspects of cyber threats and cybersecurity.
The BSI (Federal Office for Information Security, Germany) framework attempts to categorize cyber threats, and among the various standards and frameworks we've examined, it comes closest to my 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters concept. However, it still falls short of providing a comprehensive and consistently structured approach to threat identification and categorization.
While the BSI's approach shares some similarities with my framework, such as focusing on actual threats and covering a wide range of cyber threats, it has several key shortcomings:
In light of these limitations, I propose that adopting my 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters as the top-level structure for threat identification would provide a more comprehensive, consistent, and logically structured approach to understanding and categorizing cyber threats. This would enhance the effectiveness of the BSI framework, ensuring a more complete coverage of the threat landscape and a clearer connection between threats and vulnerabilities.
A threat is "Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact an asset through unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial of service."
A Threat is "Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact an asset through unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial of service."
In summary, while each framework has its strengths and weaknesses, none of them offers a complete, pragmatic solution for cyber risk management that directly links strategic risk management with operational security and threat intelligence. The Barnes Cyber Threat Cluster framework aims to fill this gap by providing a universal, consistent approach to identifying and categorizing threats, enabling organizations to develop more effective risk management strategies.
I have completely noodled through this standard, meaning I have mapped it out. Therefore, I will only list examples that demonstrate why the respective standard can NEVER be complete. And because no standard offers a Threat/Control Mapping, the examples of Threats in the standards are essentially worthless. The NCSCs, SOCs, and the Threat Intelligence Community have yet another terminology and semantics for Threats. Yes, it's time for a common language and viewpoint.
The NIST CSF functions can be used to organize controls and their objectives (e.g., "Prevent Malware Execution", "Detect Malware Execution") within each of the Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters. This combination would provide a comprehensive framework for both threat identification and risk evaluation.
The "Identify" function, enhanced with the Cyber Threat Clusters, would enable more effective management of both high-level threats and operational sub-threats, ensuring a complete and coherent control framework.
This framework integrates the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters with the NIST Cybersecurity Functions to provide a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity risk management.
For each Threat Cluster:
Controls are not complete - its a POC here
Controls are not complete - its a POC here
While NIST functions provide an excellent structure for organizing controls and their objectives within each Cyber Threat Cluster, ISO standards can play a complementary role in this framework. Organizations can leverage ISO's comprehensive control sets (such as those in ISO 27002) and risk management methodologies (ISO 27005) to enhance control selection and implementation within the NIST function structure, thereby creating a more robust and internationally aligned approach to addressing each threat cluster.
This framework can be applied to all 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters:
For each cluster, specific Control Objectives, Local Controls, and Umbrella Controls should be defined according to the unique characteristics and risks associated with that threat type.
The GOVERN (GV) function in NIST CSF 2.0 operates at a strategic level, focusing on establishing the overall cybersecurity risk management framework rather than addressing specific threats directly. Unlike functions such as PROTECT or DETECT, which have controls directly linked to mitigating or identifying particular cyber threats, GOVERN controls are "assurance controls" that ensure the organization has a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity. These controls create the structure and context within which other functions operate, including setting risk appetite, defining roles and responsibilities, and establishing policies. While the threat categorization, such as the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters, is indeed a crucial element in the risk register that GOVERN oversees, the GV controls themselves do not directly counter specific threats. Instead, they provide the strategic foundation that enables the organization to effectively manage and respond to the entire spectrum of cyber risks.
After applying the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to our 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters, the crucial next step is aligning organizational capabilities with the required controls and their objectives. This alignment, guided by the GOVERN (GV) function, ensures that your cybersecurity strategy is both comprehensive and executable.
Threat Cluster: #2 Exploiting Server
By methodically aligning capabilities with controls and control objectives for each of the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters, guided by the GOVERN function, organizations create a cohesive and effective cybersecurity strategy. This approach ensures that the organization not only identifies what needs to be done but also develops the necessary competencies to execute and sustain its security efforts across all threat clusters.
In the context of the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters, understanding the relationship between control objectives, design effectiveness, and operational effectiveness is crucial for effective risk management.
A control objective is the specific aim or purpose that a control is intended to achieve. It defines what the control should accomplish in terms of risk mitigation for a particular threat cluster. Each control is aligned with a single, clear objective.
Design effectiveness evaluates whether a control, as conceived and structured, is capable of achieving its objective if it operates as intended. It assesses the theoretical capability of the control to address the identified risk within its specific threat cluster.
Operational effectiveness focuses on whether the control is actually working as designed in practice. It examines if the control is being executed correctly and consistently over time to meet its objective.
Both design effectiveness and operational effectiveness are methods of evaluating how well a control meets its single, defined objective. They are not separate objectives themselves, but rather two aspects of assessing the control's ability to achieve its intended purpose within the framework of the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters.
By considering both design and operational effectiveness in relation to clear control objectives, organizations can more accurately assess and enhance their cybersecurity posture across all 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters.
You may guess why i stop at the Top Level Clusters for strategical Cyber Risk-Management
The Exploiting Server threat cluster targets vulnerabilities in server-side software to manipulate server behavior or gain unauthorized access using exploit code. This refinement provides a more detailed categorization of the attack vectors within this cluster: imo: job of MITRE, but until then:)
This vector targets vulnerabilities in the protocols used for communication between servers and clients.
This vector focuses on vulnerabilities within the main functionalities of the server software, including internal data parsing and handling.
This vector covers vulnerabilities that arise when the server delegates handling to external software or components.
This refinement maintains the generic nature of the threat cluster while providing a comprehensive framework for categorizing server-side exploits across various types of server software. It aligns with the concept's goal of being universally applicable across different IT systems and contexts.
The Exploiting Client threat cluster targets vulnerabilities in client-side software to manipulate client behavior or gain unauthorized access using exploit code. This refinement provides a more detailed categorization of the attack vectors within this cluster: (imo: job of MITRE, but until then:)
This vector targets vulnerabilities in the protocols used for communication between clients and servers.
This vector focuses on vulnerabilities within the main functionalities of the client software, including internal data parsing and handling.
This vector covers vulnerabilities that arise when the client delegates handling to external software or components.
This refinement maintains the generic nature of the threat cluster while providing a comprehensive framework for categorizing client-side exploits across various types of client software. It aligns with the concept's goal of being universally applicable across different IT systems and contexts.
The Physical Attack cluster can be further refined into two subcategories to provide a more nuanced understanding of the different types of physical threats: (imo: job of MITRE, but until then:)
This subcategory encompasses any attack that requires direct physical interaction with the hardware or its immediate environment.
This subcategory focuses on attacks that exploit physical vulnerabilities without direct contact with the hardware.
This refinement allows for a more precise categorization of physical threats, enabling organizations to develop more targeted security measures and risk management strategies for each subcategory of physical attacks.
This covers attacks on update mechanisms and distribution channels for software, firmware, or hardware already in use. It would include compromised third-party components delivered via updates.
This encompasses attacks on the development process, including compromises of source code repositories, build systems, or testing environments. It would also cover the incorporation of vulnerable or malicious third-party libraries or components during development.
This covers attacks that target hardware components or manufacturing processes.
Each of these subcategories represents a distinct and generic vector in the supply chain, following the axiom of distinction.
In today's interconnected digital world, cybersecurity is a global concern. However, a critical gap exists in how different countries and organizations categorize and communicate about cyber threats. This lack of standardization hinders effective international collaboration in addressing cybersecurity challenges.
The Cyber Threat Radar, based on the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters, offers a solution to this global challenge. It provides:
Cyber Threat Radars can be applied at various scales:
The following examples demonstrate how Cyber Threat Radars can be implemented at both organizational and state levels, showcasing their potential to transform global cybersecurity cooperation.
Action: Direct your SOC and Threat Intelligence teams to map incidents and near-misses to the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters. Focus on root cause analysis to identify the initial point of compromise. Implement threat radars to visualize threats specific to your organization. Ensure SOC representation in cyber strategy discussions to incorporate emerging threat trends into your risk management approach.
Count each identified threat cluster per incident. multiple count = yes
An example of a threat radar. Analyze the events (Security Incidents) regarding one of the 10 threat clusters - find the kill-chain
The 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters can be visualized through radar diagrams at different organizational levels. These visualizations help stakeholders understand threat distributions and impacts across their areas of responsibility.
The first radar represents the organization's cyber threat landscape across three key operational sectors:
Your own organization's environment where you have direct control over security measures:
Organizations or individuals that depend on your services or products:
External entities your organization depends on:
The second radar expands the perspective to critical infrastructure and societal sectors, demonstrating how the same 10 threat clusters manifest at a national level:
This state-level view enables:
Note: Both radar views demonstrate that all 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters apply universally, regardless of sector or organizational context. The key differences lie in impact levels, frequency, and specific manifestations within each domain.
An example of a nation level cyber threat radar.
To further enhance the utility of Cyber Threat Radars and facilitate more precise threat intelligence sharing, i recommend adopting a standardized notation for describing attack sequences:
For example, an attack sequence of #9>#3>#7->#7->#1->#7 could represent:
This standardized notation should be mandatory when exchanging information about attacks, especially when describing APT profiles. It allows for:
By adopting this approach, the cybersecurity community can achieve a new level of clarity and consistency in threat analysis and communication, further enhancing the power of Cyber Threat Radars in global cybersecurity efforts.
Above is a typical Malware Radar, but modern malware is multi-faceted.
This analysis examines Cobalt Strike from the perspective of the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters, demonstrating how its functionality maps to each cluster and enables various attack paths.
Cobalt Strike, as a comprehensive post-exploitation framework, embodies functionalities that span across all 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters. It serves as a prolonged arm of the attacker, providing capabilities that can be leveraged at various stages of an attack.
Cobalt Strike's diverse functionality allows attackers to construct various attack paths, chaining multiple threat clusters. The specific path followed depends on the attacker's script or campaign. For example:
This analysis demonstrates how the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters framework effectively categorizes the multifaceted capabilities of a complex tool like Cobalt Strike. It illustrates how attackers can leverage these capabilities to create diverse attack paths, chaining multiple threat clusters based on their specific campaign objectives. Understanding this mapping is crucial for comprehensive threat modeling, risk assessment, and the development of robust defense strategies.
The Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) is a widely adopted framework for sharing cyber threat intelligence. However, a critical examination reveals significant opportunities for enhancement, particularly in the areas of high-level threat categorization and attack path representation:
STIX provides a rich set of objects and relationships for describing cyber threat information, but it has limitations:
The 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters concept, along with its approach to representing attack paths, offers significant enhancements to the STIX framework:
To integrate these concepts into STIX, I propose the following:
More information and json examples
Integrating the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters and attack path concept into STIX would offer several advantages:
By integrating these concepts, STIX would be significantly enhanced, providing a more comprehensive and structured approach to representing, analyzing, and communicating about cyber threats. This integration bridges the gap between detailed threat data and strategic risk management, offering a more complete picture of the cyber threat landscape.
Based on the Amnesty International report, the NSO Group's Pegasus spyware attack paths can be categorized into several main vectors. These attack paths demonstrate the sophisticated and evolving nature of the Pegasus spyware, utilizing various threat clusters in sequence to compromise target devices:
according to Amnesty International report:
These attack paths illustrate the complex and multi-staged nature of Pegasus spyware attacks. They demonstrate how different threat clusters are chained together to bypass security measures and compromise target devices. It's important to note that these represent the most common paths identified in the report, and NSO Group continually develops new methods as security measures evolve.
Based on the attack scenario described, we can summarize the attack path using the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters as follows: (names are fictive)
Here's the breakdown:
This refined attack path demonstrates the sophisticated and multi-staged nature of modern cyber attacks, highlighting how threat actors can leverage multiple threat clusters simultaneously in the final stages to rapidly achieve widespread compromise and data encryption. The parallel execution of Abuse of Functions and Malware deployment in the last step underscores the complex and interconnected nature of advanced cyber attacks.
The Secure Software Development Life Cycle (SSDLC) provides a structured approach to embedding security throughout the software development process. By integrating the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters framework, organizations can establish a consistent, threat-informed methodology that bridges strategic security planning with tactical implementation.
The TLCTC framework maintains its core strength in the SSDLC through:
Each phase of the SSDLC must address the generic vulnerabilities identified in the TLCTC framework:
Example Requirements Mapping:
Component: Authentication System Primary Clusters: #4 (Identity Theft), #9 (Social Engineering) Secondary Clusters: #2 (Exploiting Server), #5 (Man in the Middle) Attack Sequence Risk: #9 -> #4 -> #1
Example Design Decisions:
Threat Cluster #4 (Identity Theft): - Implement MFA infrastructure - Design secure session management - Plan credential storage architecture Threat Cluster #3 (Exploiting Client): - Design input validation frameworks - Plan client-side security controls - Structure safe data handling processes
Align coding standards with threat clusters:
Example Control Implementation:
Control Objective: Prevent Identity Theft (#4) Implementation Requirements: - Password hashing with appropriate algorithms - Session token security measures - Access control enforcement points
Structure testing around threat clusters:
Example Test Scenario:
Attack Path Testing: #9 -> #3 -> #7 1. Simulate phishing attack (#9) 2. Attempt client-side exploit (#3) 3. Test malware prevention (#7)
Focus on operational security controls:
Implement ongoing security processes:
Each phase incorporates relevant NIST CSF functions:
1. Requirements (IDENTIFY):
2. Design (PROTECT):
3. Implementation (PROTECT):
4. Testing (DETECT):
5. Deployment (PROTECT, DETECT):
6. Maintenance (RESPOND, RECOVER):
1. Consistent Security Approach
2. Improved Risk Management
3. Enhanced Communication
Integrating the TLCTC framework into the SSDLC creates a comprehensive approach to secure software development. This integration ensures that security considerations are consistently addressed throughout the development lifecycle, with clear traceability between threats, vulnerabilities, and controls. The framework's logical structure and comprehensive coverage provide a solid foundation for building secure software systems that can withstand modern cyber threats.
Secure coding is far more than a final checkpoint before release. It's an ongoing discipline, woven into each phase of the Secure Software Development Life Cycle (SSDLC). By linking coding decisions to a well-defined threat taxonomy—such as the 10 Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters (TLCTC)—development teams gain clarity on the specific risks they face and the precise measures needed to mitigate them. This approach not only reduces guesswork but also streamlines alignment with external intelligence sources like CERT advisories, CISA alerts, and CVE databases, enabling a faster and more coherent response to emerging threats.
The TLCTC framework breaks down the vast cyber threat landscape into focused clusters, each reflecting a category of adversarial behavior. Instead of generic guidelines, developers can pinpoint which secure coding practices matter most for the threats at hand. This "threat-to-control" mapping transforms abstract security policies into concrete, actionable measures at the code level.
By mapping controls to threat clusters, teams can apply them consistently throughout the SSDLC:
While internal frameworks guide day-to-day coding, external advisories from CERT, CISA alerts, and CVE databases frequently warn of new vulnerabilities and attack techniques. Mapping these external reports to the TLCTC taxonomy allows developers to immediately relate new threats to familiar categories:
This shared vocabulary streamlines communication. Instead of translating external bulletins into cryptic engineering tasks, teams quickly apply known controls to the relevant threat cluster. The result is a faster, more effective response and a coherent defense strategy that integrates internal coding standards with external intelligence sources.
Earlier threat modeling methodologies like STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) provided useful lenses for understanding certain types of attacks. STRIDE helped break down the enormous scope of security concerns into manageable buckets, guiding developers away from a purely ad hoc approach.
However, as the threat landscape has grown more complex and specialized, STRIDE’s categories can feel too broad or outdated compared to the nuanced approach of the TLCTC. While STRIDE remains a valuable historical and foundational concept, the TLCTC framework offers a more direct mapping from modern, often specialized attacks (like supply chain breaches or client-side exploits) to concrete coding practices. This granularity and relevance to current threats make TLCTC a powerful evolution of earlier methodologies.
By adopting the TLCTC framework and linking it to secure coding practices, organizations build robust security into their development lifecycle. Every coding choice correlates with a recognized threat cluster, and every external warning—whether from CERT, CISA, or CVE—is easily mapped to familiar controls. The inclusion of concrete examples ensures new readers can calibrate their understanding quickly. While earlier models like STRIDE paved the way for structured threat analysis, TLCTC meets today’s challenges head-on with greater specificity, adaptability, and direct applicability.
In doing so, software security matures from a reactive, post-release scramble into a proactive, well-informed endeavor that thrives on shared language, continuous improvement, and close alignment with the evolving threat environment.
v1.2 - 2024-12-08
v1.1 - 2024-11-24
v1.0 - 2024-09-01
Prototype Development - December 2022
While the following examples provide some guidance, they are not always precise, as they are not standardized definitions. I am referring to MITRE here, with the understanding that MITRE would need to be "expanded."
See my proposal for MITRE here: [LINK]. NIST and CISA likely appreciate this as well. I am, of course, open to the idea of creating potential sub-clusters. However, my goal was to define straightforward top-level categories.
For those interested in a "logical" further development of this concept, please follow this link:
Refinement Examples (concept level).
Following examples should give you an idea of the direction. IMO: Most are "buzzwords", means lack of definition -> Hello MITRE and NIST! You are welcome here :-)
1. **Abuse of Functions** - Sub-Threats: - Abuse of standard services and features - Abuse of information made public - Data Poisoning - Abuse of insecure service configurations - Abuse of legitimate system tools (e.g., lolBins, PowerShell)) - ARP Spoofing -> leads to man in the middle #5 - DNS Spoofing -> leads to man in the middle #5 - BGP Hijacking -> leads to man in the middle #5 - SSL Stripping (attacker needs to be MitM already eg via ARP-Poisoning - and SSL Stripping is an abuse of a (downgrade) function
2. **Exploiting Server** - Sub-Threats: - Buffer Overflows - SQL Injections - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - XML External Entity (XXE) Attacks - Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) - Directory Traversal - Ping of Death
3. **Expoiting Client** - Sub-Threats: - Malvertising - Watering Hole Attacks - Clients App Exploits (e.g. Browser, PDF Reader, Java, Flash) - Insecure Deserialization
4. **Identity Theft** - Sub-Threats: - Credential Stuffing (eg IDs & Passwords, Certificates, Private Keys) - Session Hijacking - Pass-the-Ticket/Pass-the-Hash Attacks - Token Hijacking - password spray attacks - Brute-Force Attacks - Fake Websites - Domain Squatting
5. **Man in the Middle** - Sub-Threats: (MitM has a focus on a already compromised environment - you cannot trust any components between the endpoints A and B) - Wi-Fi Eavesdropping (attacker needs to be MitM already eg within physical range -> #8) - Pineapple Attacks (attacker needs to be MitM already eg within physical range -> #8) - Rogue Hotspots (attacker needs to be MitM already eg within physical range -> #8 then eg fakes SSID #4)
6. **Flooding Attack** - Sub-Threats: mostly known as DDOS Attacks on different layers - SYN Flood - UDP Flood - HTTP Flood - ICMP Flooding - Slowloris - NTP/DNS Amplification Attacks - Botnet-Driven Attacks
7. **Malware** - Sub-Threats: - Ransomware - Trojans - Keyloggers - Rootkits - Spyware - Worms - Adware - Mobile Malware - E-Banking Malware
8. **Physical Attack** Direct Physical Access Attacks: - Evil Maid Attacks - Hardware Keyloggers - Direct Hardware Tampering - Device Theft - Physical Intrusion into Secure Areas - USB Baiting (leaving malicious USB devices) - Replacement of Hardware Components - Physical Damage to Infrastructure Indirect Physical Access Attacks: - TEMPEST Attacks (Electromagnetic Emissions) - RFID Skimming - Acoustic Attacks (Sound Wave Exploitation) - Optical Attacks (e.g., Shoulder Surfing) - Thermal Imaging Attacks - Power Analysis Attacks - Environmental Manipulation (e.g., Temperature, Humidity) - Van Eck Phreaking (Remote Screen Viewing)
9. **Social Engineering** (Information Manipulation) - Sub-Threats: - CEO Fraud - Subscription Traps - Fraudulent Contests - Check Fraud - Cyberbullying - Dubious Webshop - Requests for financial help from acquaintances - Fake Support - Financial Agents - Fake Threat Emails from Authorities - Investment Fraud - Classified Ads Fraud - Package Subscription Traps - Invoice Manipulation Fraud (BEC Fraud) - Romance Scam - Defamation - Sextortion - Forbidden Pornography - Advance Fee Fraud - Web Administrators Blackmail - Tailgating (unauthorized access) - Phishing - Vishing - Smishing - Baiting (e.g., with USB sticks)
10. **Supply Chain** - Sub-Threats: - Compromised Libraries or Dependencies - Backdoors - Update-Server Hijacking - Compromised Container Images - Manipulated Hardware (physical attack on Supply Chain)