Windows Hyper-V NT Kernel Integration VSP Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2025-21333
This CVE analysis employs the Top Level Cyber Threat Clusters (TLCTC) framework, which provides a standardized approach to categorizing cyber threats based on their underlying generic vulnerabilities. The TLCTC framework enables precise mapping of vulnerabilities to specific threat clusters, focusing on the root cause rather than the outcome. This analysis specifically applies the TLCTC's axiom that "each distinct attack vector is defined by the generic vulnerability it initially targets," along with its client-server interaction model for understanding vertical stack vulnerabilities.
The following output was generated with a custom GPT which I made for CVE analysis purposes:
Prerequisites
Requires local authenticated access to a system running the vulnerable VSP component.
Interaction Context
Vertical Stack Analysis
- The NT Kernel operates in Ring 0 as the server.
- The VSP, part of the virtualization stack, functions as the client interacting with the kernel.
- The vulnerability stems from the VSP improperly handling memory pointers provided by the NT Kernel, specifically accessing memory that has already been freed, leading to a use-after-free condition (CWE-416).
Exploit Path
- An attacker must trigger a specific sequence of operations in the VSP that causes memory to be freed and then reused.
Justification
The vulnerability resides in the client-side VSP's flawed memory management during its interaction with the NT Kernel. This mismanagement leads to undefined behavior that can be exploited to escalate privileges. While the impact includes privilege escalation, the TLCTC mapping focuses on the generic vulnerability, which is a client-side flaw in memory handling, aligning this CVE with #3 Exploiting Client.
Second example: CVE-2024-12084
Interaction Context
Vertical Stack Analysis
Components:
- rsync Daemon: Operates as a server, handling file synchronization requests.
- Client: Initiates synchronization requests to the rsync daemon.
Interaction:
- The client sends a crafted request with a malicious checksum length (`s2length`) to the rsync daemon.
- The rsync daemon fails to properly validate this input, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow when `MAX_DIGEST_LEN` exceeds the fixed `SUM_LENGTH` of 16 bytes.
Privilege Levels:
- The rsync daemon typically runs with elevated privileges to perform file synchronization tasks.
- Exploitation of this vulnerability allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the rsync daemon.
Exploit Path
- An attacker crafts a request with a malicious checksum length and sends it to the rsync daemon over the network.
- The improper handling of the checksum length leads to a heap-based buffer overflow, enabling the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server.
Justification
The vulnerability is due to a flaw in the server-side code of the rsync daemon, where improper input validation allows for a heap-based buffer overflow. This aligns with TLCTC #2 Exploiting Server, as the issue resides in the server's handling of client-provided data.
No additional updates are scheduled at this time.